Industrial and Automation Control systems traditionally achieved security thanks to the use of proprietary protocols and isolation from the telecommunication networks. Nowadays, the advent of the Industrial Internet of Things poses new security challenges. In this paper, we first highlight the main security challenges that advocate for new risk assessment and security strategies.
Introduction
The security of critical services has been granted for a long time through the restriction of their communication networks, and the deployment of specific and proprietary technologies (protocols, devices, software, . . . ): the so called air-gap principle. However, the recent ongoing adoption of common technology (such as the Internet protocol), the increase in the number of interconnections between different types of networks, and the emergence of sophisticated cyber attacks [1] have jeopardized this security strategy and risen the need of novel standardization and technical practices. Therefore, it is not possible to solve security issues by taking into account only a single Critical Infrastructure (CI) (i.e., essential service or domain) but it is fundamental to consider a set of interconnected infrastructures, such as power grid, water distribution network, gas pipelines and telecommunications.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for CIs are frequently deemed vulnerable due to a mix of mindset preconceptions, design faults, and insecure technologies [2] . Moreover, Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) security requires a domain-specific security approach that cannot be effectively achieved through the straightforward adoption of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) security mechanisms, tools and techniques [3] .
Similarly, for Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)-based IACS security solutions, they were found to be lacking in scalability and cyber-physical awareness; moreover they over-rely on ICT-oriented solutions.
In fact, Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) requires the use of event processing mechanisms able to scale beyond the capacity of existing conventional SIEM systems, which are frequently based on correlation engines with constrained or inexistent scaling capabilities. The complexity of protecting CIs is increased due to the existence of dependencies among physical equipments of essential services. The lack of awareness about the physical side effect of cyber-attacks compromises the supervision and/or the control of the physical processes thus leading to cascading effects. Finally, ICT-oriented approaches, such as perimeter-based defense, have proven to be inadequate to protect IACS [4] .
It is also worth noticing that vulnerability management is usually a long process and many known vulnerabilities often remain unpatched for long periods even in CIs for many reasons. Mostly it is due to old legacy software/hardware and non automated updating procedures, but also for the need of a scheduled maintenance window, to avoid service disruption. During this period of time, CI's owners continue to rely on vulnerable hardware and software. New solutions were devised to decrease the impact of cyberthreats through timely warning of the stakeholders and by forcing them to react in time. However, the current vulnerability management system solutions still have several limitations. Most of them are related to specific sectors to grant their commercial sustainability and this is not applicable in the case of large infrastructures. Besides this, technical deployment constraints are often difficult to adapt to the specific CI environment. Finally, many solutions have limited connection to other security systems such as risk assessment and monitoring tools [5, 6] . Actual regulations, national standards, or guidelines are only suggestions and checklists for critical services providers. They do not supply a platform for detecting cyber threats and evaluating their consequences on the physical process allowing also reaction capabilities [7] .
An effective solution to ensure an adequate level of resiliency while accommodating the diffusion of new technologies into CIs, is presented in the ATENA project [8] . It is focused on the definition of ad-hoc methodologies for controlling physical flow efficiency while improving resilience of interconnected CIs against Cyber-Physical attacks. These objectives are achieved by developing:
• New anomaly detection algorithms and risk assessment methodologies specifically designed for a distributed Cyber-Physical environment.
Traditional computer security focuses on how to protect information.
Here, a novel perspective is adopted, considering how attacks affect estimation, control and monitoring algorithms, how they affect the plant, and the decision made by the human operators.
• A suite of integrated ICT networked components for detection and reaction in presence of adverse events. They are devised to define a resilient control system according to the security-by-detection paradigm.
The Software Defined Network (SDN) is used to redirect the malicious network traffic and to protect the system.
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The ATENA architecture, presented in this paper, provides a framework for the development of these tools in a scalable and distributed way to cope with the IIoT challenges.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents previous related works, Section 3 illustrates the overall Advanced Tools to assEss and mitigate the criticality of ICT compoNents and their dependencies over Critical InfrAstructures (ATENA) system architecture, while Sections 4 -6 detail each component. Finally, in Section 7 the discussion on future developments are presented and the conclusions are drawn.
Related work: the logic behind the ATENA project
The ATENA architecture is based on the outcomes of both the MICIE [9] and the CockpitCI [10] projects. The goal of the aforementioned projects is the development of a security platform for inter-dependent CIs. These projects present evolving solutions with respect to the previous one according to the development of the state-of-the-art. The ATENA architecture addresses the new challenges arising with the advent of the IIoT paradigm.
In the following, an overview of the MICIE and of the CockpitCI projects is Within each protected IACS domain, a PIDS instance is deployed to detect coordinated cyber-attacks. T is can be done by collecting, aggregating and correlating evidences gathered through probes deployed in the CI.
The PIDS agents are able to incapsulate customized third party modules (e.g., the Snort NIDS [12] or the OSSEC HIDS [13] ), which are integrated using coupling modules), as well as components specifically developed for CockpitCI (e.g., the Shadow Security Unit (SSU) [10] , the SCADA Honeypot [14] [15], Host Output Traffic Control, or the Vulnerability, Behaviour 6 and Exec checker agents [11] ). The RP in CockpitCI represents an improvement with respect to the one developed in MICIE. It considers the effect of cyber attacks on devices and on services and assesses the consequences of cyber threats on physical devices. Also the SMGW capabilities are improved. This enhanced version is able to deep inspect a larger amount of data and traffic passing through the considered CIs. Finally, the adaptors were improved in terms of scalability and flexibility.
The main drawback of the CockpitCI approach is the fact that it is mainly hardwired into the RP and therefore misses flexibility and the ability to deal with the different security threats. Thus, the CockpitCI architecture is not suitable for the IIoT paradigm. As an example, the PIDS was not designed The ATENA system proposes to address the following novelties:
• The enforcement of the prevent-detect-react approach by: (i) expanding the results in the state-of-the-art in the field of detection and risk assessment; (ii) introducing the ability to evaluate and suggest the most secure configuration of the used asset, in order to assure the achievement of the desired security level in normal operational mode; (iii) developing real-time reaction strategies to mitigate the consequences of detected treats.
• The introduction of the so-called Software Defined Security, to bring the results and innovation of SDN in the field of CIs by supervising their control, operational and corporate networks.
• The introduction of a distributed Intrusion and Anomaly Detection System (IADS) to cope with the distribution of the functionalities in modern CIs and to detect physical anomalies caused by cyber attacks.
To achieve ATENA goals, a set of interconnected security components has been designed in order to innovate models, methodologies and algorithms for security management. The overall ATENA architecture is sketched in Figure 1 and it is composed by four main functional blocks:
• The Assets Management and Interface represents the interface between the ATENA system and both the CI and the IACS. This module is devoted to filter and to normalize the data provided by the SCADA 9 control room and forward them to the remaining modules of ATENA system. The processed data contributes to form the knowledge base together with the information on CI assets and procedures supplied by the CI management team operator.
• The Cyber Detection System (CDS) collects information from distributed probes, the ICT component and the SCADA system to determine and, eventually, notify anomalies in the behavior or the state of the CI.
• The Slow Control Loop exploits and addresses the information about vulnerabilities and/or anomalies arisen in CI and recorded in the knowledge base. The vulnerabilities of CI are detected and notified by periodic scans of the CI configuration. This module is able to suggest to the CI operator the proper configurations of the equipment and services to guarantee a desidered security level.
• The Fast Control Loop computes the current and predicted risk level for the CI. This information is used to evaluate proper mitigation actions to prevent faults and attacks. It provides the mitigation actions as a decision support system for the CI operators. Thereafter, the human decisions are directly actuated on the proper field.
All communications between the modules of the ATENA system, the CI and the IACS are secured by the use of a SMGW. It grants adequate and strict security policies for both exposed services and data exchange (e.g., data encryption protocol, trusting schemes between communication counterparts) to prevent data interception or modification and to protect the trading of sensitive information within the infrastructure. Furthermore, it allows authorized personnel to perform control and management operations by using access control mechanisms (e.g., identity and access management, accounting, audit). The SMGW guarantees the resiliency of the whole system by preventing a faulty part to affect or shatter the overall functionalities. It is realized in a scalable environment in order to be able to avoid performance degradation when a substantial increase in the data throughput of the infrastructure occurs. It is worth noticing that the SMGW is designed to provide scalability at component level in order to be added to the system in a dynamic and non-intrusive way.
To get insights about how the different modules interact, let us consider 
Cyber Detection System
The main component of the CDS is the Intrusion and Anomaly Detecton System (IADS). The IADS constitutes an Heterogeneous Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) which is responsible for the cyber-security detection capabilities of the ATENA framework, by continuously monitoring the protected infrastructure to detect anomalous behavior or evidence of ongoing attacks.
The IADS architecture is based on the dominant SIEM paradigm which became popular after the first security incidents with considerable societal impact and visibility, such as the Stuxnet worm [1] , the WannaCry Ransomware [16] , and Flame [17] . Its architecture, illustrated in Figure 2 Third-party data sources are integrated as probes, by means of adaptors, whose purpose is to normalize data feeds and implement the client side for the interface between the detection agents and the IADS. In ATENA we can distinguish mainly between three types of agents:
• Statistical protocol probes: they capture different statistical attributes and send them to the domain processor. These statistical attributes 7 We will use the term probes and agents interchangeably.
14 have been successfully used to identify network protocols [20, 21] . The statistical analysis uses different attributes to create a unique fingerprint of the flow and it is able to distinguish between compressed or encrypted protocols and clear-text protocols.
• Software Defined Network assisted probes: SDN is used to automate the deployment of virtualized probes (that are technically Virtual Network Functions), which can be launched according with the IADS needs. This allows the security operator for the IACS to instantiate and deploy probes across the network infrastructure, chosen from a library of available templates. This is effectively and NFV-based scenario where each probe is hosted within its own virtual environment (a container), with SDN providing traffic steering capabilities.
• Network signature agents: these agents are used to combine the advantages from signature-based detection techniques with the advantages from machine learning detection from the domain processor. A signature-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is adopted as a standalone agent which receives signatures from the IADS platform and sends all detected events through the data streaming platform.
Domain Processors
Domain Processors pre-process the information gathered from the probes, in order to reduce noise and aggregate events before their analysis. Domain processors are ideally deployed near the probe deployment points, where all relevant evidence for the IADS is collected. Despite their capabilities, Domain processors are more focused on mitigating and reducing data streaming noise with a minimum overhead rather than analyzing the data itself. The domain processors implement the service-side endpoints for the probe interfaces.
The Distributed Big Data SIEM
The Distributed Big Data SIEM implements the main analytics capabilities for the IADS, encompassing two types of data modules: streaming (fast path, for online event stream processing) and batch processing (slow path, for slow jobs that may take time to complete). Moreover, the SIEM algorithms can be optionally fed with topology and eventually also asset information obtained from asset management tools or databases.
Slow Control Loop
The Slow Control Loop performs periodic scans of the CI configuration to address the detected vulnerabilities. It is organized in two modules: the Vulnerability Management System and the COMPoser (COMP). The former evaluates long-term vulnerabilities, while the latter provides off-line security.
Vulnerability Management System
This module protects IT systems in the period from the detection of new vulnerabilities to the implementation of the corresponding patch. This module detects threats linked to potential vulnerabilities and increases the awareness level of the operational teams when no cyber-attack is running.
These tasks are crucial for computing the risk level of nodes, of services, and of the whole monitored system.
The VMS provides the following functionalities:
• • The retrieval of cyber-threats information by means of IADS to update the vulnerability state of components according to the current situation (e.g., the detection of a security breach in the perimeter increases the vulnerability of specific components previously protected).
• The visualization of the vulnerability state of the components to alert operators.
• The transmission of information to the COMP to improve the long-term mitigation strategies (e.g., hardening of security policy, management of patching campaigns).
• The transmission of vulnerability information to the fast control loop to assess the current risk of the CI.
It is worth noticing that the Vulnerability Management System (VMS)
is integrated in the overall ATENA architecture and it is based on a wellknown rating framework (i.e. Common Vulnerability System (CVS)) and on the relative taxonomies. Thus, it is able to feed the other modules, as well as standardized vulnerability database, in a proper manner.
Composer
The COMP module grants the off-line security by means of two functionalities. First it quantifies the current CI security level according to properly defined metrics; second, given the potential threats and countermeasures, it computes the optimal CI configuration to assure a desired, static, security level, exploiting the approach of composable security introduced in [25, 26] .
Security can be achieved by exploiting four levels of information: assets to be protected, menaces/threats affecting these assets, countermeasures to mitigate the menaces, desired security level and context.
The COMP aims at extending the composable security framework to the cyber-physical domain. It takes into account component lifespan, physical consequences of cyber-attacks and the corresponding countermeasures. The COMP is organized in two modules:
• The Metrics Evaluator (ME) module evaluates the security level of a given configuration, based on the assets to be protected, the affecting menaces and the available countermeasures;
• The Optimal Configuration Computation (OCC) module computes the optimal configuration of CI elements that satisfies the target security level and the desired context. In particular, this module uses the metrics quantification capabilities offered by the ME to associate a security level to each potential system configuration. Then, according to proper optimization or heuristic-based algorithms, the OCC module ranks and sorts these configurations (i.e. candidate solutions) to identify the one that optimizes: the security level vs the desired one, and the actual context vs the desired one.
Fast Control Loop
The Fast Control Loop encompasses the human-in-the-loop paradigm. It is devoted to identify risks, evaluate the propagation of threats, support the operators in the selection of the reaction strategy, and implement the human decision. This is achieved by ad-hoc defined modules, namely, the RANT, the RP, the mitigation module and the orchestrator.
Risk Analysis Tool
This module assesses the current risk, based on the detection of cyberthreats and on the analysis of the vulnerabilities of the infrastructure components. The objective is to provide a risk oversight interface. To this end, the RANT provides five operations:
1. The encoding of the risk key metrics: a dedicated interface to CIs security is responsible to encode the initial risk key metrics of components, The RANT assesses the risk in terms of service dependability according to a three-level rating (High/Medium/Low). The dependability criteria is considered as a weighted trade-off function of the following security criteria:
availability, integrity, confidentiality, maintainability, and safety properties of the elementary services provided by the considered node. The assessed risk is forwarded to ATENA modules (e.g., RP).
Risk Predictor
The main objective of the RP is to assess the current situation and to envisage the consequences of adverse events, due to the existence of interdependencies among CIs.
The RP is a software platform (CISIApro), based on the Mixed Holistic Reductionist (MHR) approach [27] . MHR is a reference framework in which each infrastructure is divided into single components, services and holistic nodes. Components represent the reductionist level; they decompose the infrastructure into sections that can be affected by faults or cyber-threats.
Services are considered as aggregated values of the components. Holistic nodes consider the system under analysis as a whole.
The RP is implemented as an agent-based simulator. Each component of the CI (i.e., device, service or macro-component) is represented by an agent.
The agents are interconnected by using directed links in order to exchange information. Each agent receives resources and faults/threats from upstream agents and sends resources and faults/threats to downstream agents, and its state is represented by the operative level, i.e. the ability to properly produce its outputs.
The RP can manage the malfunctioning of a single component, the consequences of natural events or the impacts of cyber-threats. The RP evaluates the risk related to components and services by predicting the availability of crucial services.
The RP could run in a distributed fashion: in this case several CISIApro engines and databases are maintained up-to-date by exchanging only a small portion of information (e.g., the quality of service).
21
The output of the RP is a real-time assessment of the risk level associated to assets and its uncertainty; it is used in the mitigation phase for countermeasures ranking.
Mitigation module
The mitigation module, based on the risk level computed by the RP, provides the operator with a list of the optimal countermeasures to be used in the current state, or to be applied to update the "reaction trajectory" as the state evolves. To this end, it improves the decision process by considering both the current and future states of the system. Moreover, it considers the cascading effects among interconnected infrastructures and the impact of cyber-threats [28] . The mitigation module is designed as a set of algorithms that suggests the reaction strategy to CI operators, based on multiple criteria.
Envisaged reaction algorithms include:
1. Reconfiguration of network services according to the orchestrator module;
2. Physical network topology reconfiguration, to prevent and react to adverse events by restoring the service [29] ;
3. Optimal control, to schedule in a more efficient way critical interconnected equipment [30] .
Based on the output of the mitigation module, the operator takes its decision and applies it through the SCADA control centers and through the orchestrator module.
Orchestrator
The orchestrator is a distributed framework designed for dynamically managing the telecommunication infrastructure from a security point of view.
The aim of this module is to virtualize the security functions and to separate control and data planes, as usually done in SDN. It is based on a central logic unit, and several units deployed in the CI, including firewalls, SDN routers, and SDN switches.
The services provided by the orchestrator are:
• Dynamical association between orchestrator and controlled units;
• Dynamical management of trust relationships among orchestrator and application logic based on mutual authentication and continuous monitoring of application logic reputation;
• Isolation of each security domain based on interfaces enabling the use of a minimal set of operations and communications between different domains;
• Adoption of trusted component.
Basically, the orchestrator takes inputs from the mitigation module and, under the supervision of the operator, applies the best security reaction strategy on the telecommunication network implementing a Software Defined Security (SDS) approach as shown in Figure 3 . As introduced in [31] , SDS is a framework mimicking the SDN approach that has been successfully being applied for managing communications networks. The main goal of SDS is the decoupling of the control and the operation part of a security system by 23 exploiting virtualization of security techniques. This approach has been applied to IoT networks [32] and to SDN-based 5G networks [33] . In ATENA, this concept is extended to the monitoring of the telecommunication networks as well as to the monitoring of high level information shared through the CI network. 
Discussion and Conclusions
This paper presents a novel logical security framework for IACSs. This A prototypal release of SMGW was designed in the MICIE project, and was improved in the CockpitCI framework. In this case, it played a central role in achieving security awareness by sharing information on detected cyber-attacks between interdependent CIs. In ATENA, the SMGW is further improved. It assures the secure, efficient and reliable exchange of data within the entities belonging to the same or a different CI. It also shares information arising from both local and remote entities, to increase the resilience level of the whole system. Moreover, the SMGW is responsible for intercepting and handling every message generated by the ATENA modules The main feature of the Vulnerability Management system is the ability to retrieve information from both official and alternative sources in order to set up a complete dedicated database of potential vulnerabilities.
Modeling and analyzing CI interdependencies is a broad research area that generates many tools and methodologies [34] . The RP is innovative from different perspectives [35] . It is fed by real data generated from the control centers of the different CIs, so it evaluates the consequences of adverse events on a regular basis, usually on a second-based scale. It collects information from the IADS on actual threats and maps them into risks by means of the RANT. It explicitly considers the Quality of Service (QoS) of each CI; therefore, it assesses the consequences of faults and cyber threats not only on devices but also on the provided service to the customers. In 
